As a leading expert in energy management and grid security, Christopher Hailstone has a unique perspective on the forces reshaping America’s power landscape. Today, we delve into a seismic shift occurring within the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), an agency historically defined by its independence. We will explore the profound implications of new White House oversight, the blurring of lines between the NRC and the Department of Energy (DOE), and the real-world consequences of a major staff exodus. The conversation will also address the ongoing debate about whether deregulation is the key to unlocking a nuclear renaissance and examine new processes that some fear could compromise the agency’s role as a staunch safety regulator.
With the White House’s Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs now reviewing all significant NRC regulatory actions, how does this change the day-to-day process for staff? Can you describe the practical effects this has had on the timeline for new rules, such as those for advanced reactors?
This new layer of White House review has introduced a profound chill and a significant slowdown. On a practical level, it means that draft rules, even routine ones, are no longer transparently developed within the agency and then released for public comment. Instead, they are routed through the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, or OIRA, and must gain its approval before the public ever sees them. This brings the process behind a curtain, as one person familiar with the communications described the goal as ensuring “no daylight between the White House and the NRC.” Ironically, for an administration focused on speed, this has created procedural hurdles. The much-anticipated fusion rule, which the commissioners were ready to publish in May, has been languishing in White House review since July. We’re seeing the same concerns for major rulemakings like the updates to environmental reviews and the critical “Part 53” licensing path for advanced reactors, which are now expected to be delayed or significantly altered.
The traditional separation between the DOE as a technology promoter and the NRC as a safety regulator appears to be shifting, with officials from both agencies serving on a joint steering committee. Could you explain the practical implications of this collaboration and share any specific examples of its influence?
The implications are fundamental and strike at the very heart of why the NRC was created in 1975. That separation was intentional, designed to prevent a conflict of interest. Now, that line is almost completely erased. We see senior DOE officials, like legal adviser Seth Cohen, sitting on a top-level steering committee with the NRC’s new General Counsel and Executive Director. This committee provides feedback and recommends regulatory reforms, putting immense pressure on commissioners. The influence is tangible. For instance, the DOE unilaterally repealed its decades-old radiation safety standard, which required keeping exposure “as low as reasonably achievable,” arguing it was overly burdensome. The DOE’s memo explicitly stated this was done to “advance those discussions” with the NRC about relaxing its own standards. This isn’t just collaboration; it’s one agency, the promoter, directly steering the safety policies of the regulator.
The NRC reportedly lost over 10% of its staff and saw major changes in senior leadership. What has been the tangible impact of these departures on the agency’s institutional knowledge and its ability to handle a surge in new reactor applications? Please provide some details.
Losing over a tenth of your workforce in a single year is a staggering blow for any agency, but for one as specialized as the NRC, it’s catastrophic. A third of those departures were buyouts, but the rest were resignations or firings, which creates a climate of uncertainty and fear. The loss of institutional memory is immense, especially as we see a surge in applications for first-of-a-kind reactor designs from startups. The real gut punch, however, was at the senior leadership level. The executive director of operations was fired, and the general counsel resigned. They were replaced by an NRC veteran and an energy industry attorney who had just come from the DOE, respectively. These new leaders now sit on that joint steering committee with the DOE, cementing the administration’s influence right at the top of the agency’s operational and legal structure. This isn’t just a personnel change; it’s a structural realignment that fundamentally weakens the agency’s ability to act independently.
Some view the current push for deregulation as an experiment to test the theory that NRC rules have been the primary obstacle to nuclear power’s growth. What are the key arguments for and against this theory, and what metrics would you use to measure the experiment’s success?
This is the central debate. The argument for this “experiment,” championed by many in Silicon Valley and the administration, is that the NRC’s regulatory regime has been so cumbersome and stifling for decades that it has single-handedly prevented a nuclear renaissance. They believe that by cutting red tape and accelerating licensing, new technologies from startups like TerraPower and Oklo will flourish. The argument against this, voiced by safety advocates and many former officials, is that the industry’s stagnation has far more to do with economics—competition from cheap natural gas and a severe lack of financing—than with regulation. They point out that the NRC can’t control market forces. To measure success, you’d need to look beyond just the number of licenses approved. The real metrics would be whether these newly approved reactors can secure financing, be built on time and on budget, and ultimately generate electricity at a competitive price. If licenses are granted but no new plants are actually built and connected to the grid, the experiment will have failed and only succeeded in weakening our nation’s safety watchdog.
A new process allows the NRC to observe developers’ work with the DOE and DOD before a formal application. How does this “pre-application engagement” work in practice, and what specific safeguards are in place to ensure the NRC’s final safety review remains genuinely independent and not a “rubber stamp”?
In practice, this process details NRC staff to essentially embed with the DOE and Department of Defense as they work with a reactor developer. The idea is for the NRC to observe, ask questions, and provide safety feedback early on, so that when a formal application for a commercial license arrives, the review can be much quicker. The concern, famously articulated by a DOE official who allegedly suggested the NRC would “rubber-stamp” their work, is that this early integration could compromise the NRC’s objectivity. The primary safeguard is the official staff guidance memo, which reasserts the NRC’s role as the final independent regulator for commercial reactors. It outlines a process, but it’s really just paper. The true test, as former chair Steve Burns noted, will be in the outcomes. Will the NRC challenge designs already approved by the DOE or military? Or will its judgment be swayed by the immense political pressure and the months of prior collaboration? The independence of the final review hinges entirely on the resolve of the commission and its staff to stand their ground.
What is your forecast for the future of the NRC’s independence and its ability to function as the nation’s primary nuclear safety regulator?
My forecast is cautiously pessimistic in the short term but hopeful in the long run. Right now, the agency is under a level of political and inter-agency influence that is unprecedented in its nearly 50-year history. The combination of White House review, DOE integration, and a politically reshaped commission means its independence is severely compromised. However, the core of the NRC is its dedicated, expert staff. While many have left, many remain who are committed to the safety mission. There are also voices, like Judi Greenwald of the Nuclear Innovation Alliance, who see signs the administration is learning that a credible, functional NRC is key to any real nuclear revival, not an obstacle to it. The institution can be repaired, and it’s not too late to fix this. But it will require a concerted effort to restore the firewall between the promoter and the regulator and a renewed commitment from Congress and the White House to respect the agency’s vital, independent safety mission.
